Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing

In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Filippini, Luigi
Published in:	International Journal of Business and Economics. - College of Business, ISSN 1607-0704. - Vol. 5.2006, 3, p. 201-210
Publisher:	College of Business
Subject:	cross-licensing \| patent pool \| specialization \| process innovation

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598965