Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test.

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

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Year of publication:	2007-12-20
Authors:	Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina AV
Institutions:	Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
Subject:	Terrorism \| Decentralization \| Democracy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 686 28 pages
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649514