Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Yi, Jianxin ; Wang, Hefei ; Li, Yong |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 173.2018, p. 113-117
|
Subject: | Efficiency | Financial constraints | Impossibility | Incentive compatibility | Mechanism design | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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