When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Zhang, Jun |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 119.2020, p. 251-266
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Subject: | Efficiency | Fairness | Group strategy-proofness | Object allocation | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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