Designing incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm
Year of publication: |
August 2018
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Authors: | Scheele, Lisa M. ; Thonemann, Ulrich ; Slikker, Marco |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 8, p. 3690-3713
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Subject: | behavioral operations | experimental economics | asymmetric forecast information | information sharing | sales incentives | forecast error | signaling | Theorie | Theory | Prognoseverfahren | Forecasting model | Anreiz | Incentives | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Experiment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prognose | Forecast |
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