Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Corchón, Luis C. ; Rueda-Llano, José |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 12.2008, 4, p. 279-291
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Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling |
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