Do voluntary clawback adoptions curb overinvestment?
Year of publication: |
July 2017
|
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Authors: | Lin, Yu-Chun |
Published in: |
Corporate governance : an international review. - Oxford : Blackwell, ISSN 0964-8410, ZDB-ID 1280434-4. - Vol. 25.2017, 4, p. 255-270
|
Subject: | Corporate Governance | Clawback Provisions | Compensation | Overinvestment | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Theorie | Theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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