Does competition aggravate moral hazard? : a Multi-Principal-Agent experiment
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rud, Olga A. ; Rabanal, Jean Paul ; Horowitz, John B. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial intermediation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1042-9573, ZDB-ID 1053781-8. - Vol. 33.2018, p. 115-121
|
Subject: | Conflict of interests | Deception | Delegated portfolio management | Laboratory experiment | Market design | Rating services | Experiment | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Portfolio-Management | Portfolio selection | Wettbewerb | Competition | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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