Does contract enforcement mitigate holdup?
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Cookson, J. Anthony |
Published in: |
The review of corporate finance studies. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 2046-9128, ZDB-ID 2683772-9. - Vol. 7.2018, 2, p. 245-275
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Subject: | Hold-Up | Contract Enforcement | Investment | Native American Reservations | Vertrag | Contract | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Investition | Indianer | Native Americans | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
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