Downward Wage Rigidity in a Model of Equal Treatment Contracting
Following insights by <link rid="b5">Bewley (1999a)</link>, this paper analyses a model with downward rigidities in which firms cannot pay discriminately based on year of entry to the firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wages and unemployment. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where forward-looking firms take into account these constraints. We show that there is a frontloading incentive that leads to a simple solution in the case of certainty. Using productivity data from the postwar US economy, we analyse the ability of the model to match certain stylised labour market facts. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2010 .
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Martins, Pedro ; Snell, Andy ; Thomas, Jonathan P. |
Published in: |
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9442. - Vol. 112.2010, 4, p. 841-863
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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