Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Hori, Keiichi ; Osano, Hiroshi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 111.2020, p. 1-28
|
Subject: | Continuous-time agency | Executive compensation | Managerial turnover | Mandatory deferral of incentive pay | Reference-dependent utility | Stochastic replacement | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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