Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sleet, Christopher ; Yeltekin, Şevin |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 18.2001, 1, p. 207-235
|
Subject: | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Theorie | Theory | Numerisches Verfahren | Numerical analysis |
-
The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives
Foarta, Dana, (2018)
-
Double-sided moral hazard, efficiency wages, and litigation
Gürtler, Oliver, (2010)
-
Double-sided moral hazard, efficiency wages and litigation
Gürtler, Oliver, (2007)
- More ...
-
Fiscal hedging with nominal assets
Lustig, Hanno, (2008)
-
Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
Sleet, Christopher, (2007)
-
Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets
Sleet, Christopher, (2006)
- More ...