Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sleet, Christopher ; Yeltekin, Şevin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 31.2007, 5, p. 1557-1583
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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