Dynamic mechanism design : a myersonian approach
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Pavan, Alessandro ; Segal, Ilya ; Toikka, Juuso |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 82.2014, 2, p. 601-653
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Subject: | Asymmetric informaton | stochastic processes | incentives | mechanism design | envelope theorems | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Anreiz | Incentives | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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