Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Besbes, Omar ; Weintraub, Gabriel |
| Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 67.2019, 3, p. 711-730
|
| Subject: | dynamic mechanism design | limited commitment | budget constraints | fluid approximation | display advertising | internet auctions | revenue management | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/opre.2018.1830 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012040237