The role of executive risk-taking incentives in voluntary disclosure accuracy
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Baginski, Stephen P. ; Campbell, John L. ; Moon, James R. ; Warren, Jams D. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial reporting : a publication of the Financial Accounting and Reporting Section of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 2380-2154, ZDB-ID 3063413-1. - Vol. 7.2022, 1, p. 25-47
|
Subject: | management forecast accuracy | compensation incentives | truthful disclosure | voluntary disclosure | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Theorie | Theory | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
-
The role of convex equity incentives in managers' forecasting decisions
Cho, Young Jun, (2021)
-
Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure
Xiong, Yan, (2022)
-
Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value
Chung, Huimin, (2015)
- More ...
-
Skin in the game : personal stock holdings and investors' response to stock analysis on social media
Campbell, John L., (2019)
-
Employee quality and financial reporting outcomes
Call, Andrew C., (2017)
-
Do Career Concerns Affect the Delay of Bad News Disclosure?
Baginski, Stephen P., (2017)
- More ...