Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Schummer, James |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 30.2000, 2, p. 293-318
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Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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