Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

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Authors:	Rachmilevitch, Shiran
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Haifa
Subject:	Auctions \| Bid rotation \| Collusion \| Repeated games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number WP2011/9 2 pages long
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324195