ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Kessler, Anke S. ; Lülfesmann, Christoph ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 2098714. - Vol. 46.2005, 4, p. 1207-1232
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