Endogenous Wage-Compliance and "Underground" Wages in Oligopoly

This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages (i.e. equilibrium wages lower than the, officially minimum, sectoral ones), may emerge endogenously in industries with market power. Wage bargaining is centralized and it is conducted by large-scale efficient firms and their own union. Small-scale inefficient firms are officially considered to be wage-takers.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Vlassis, M.
Institutions:	Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business (AUEB)
Subject:	WAGES \| BARGAINING \| OLIGOPOLIES

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Series:	DEOS Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008619393