English Auctions and the Stolper - Samuelson Theorem

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results

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Year of publication:	[2009]
Authors:	Dubra, Juan
Other Persons:	Echenique, Federico (contributor) ; Manelli, Alejandro (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2007 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1118843 [DOI]
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; D44 - Auctions ; F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720675