Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles,and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

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Year of publication:	2009-12-07
Authors:	Geir B. , Asheim ; Voorneveld, Max ; W. Weibull, Jörgen
Institutions:	Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
Subject:	Epistemic game theory \| epistemic stability \| rationalizability \| closedness under rational behavior \| mutual p-belief

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Memorandum Number 01/2010 21 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511665