Evaluation and strategic manipulation
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Amorós, Pablo |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 106.2023, p. 1-9
|
Subject: | Evaluation | Impartiality | Manipulability | Ranking of candidates | Mechanism design | Manipulation | Bewertung | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Ranking-Verfahren | Ranking method | Experiment |
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