Obvious manipulations
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Troyan, Peter ; Morrill, Thayer |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 185.2020, p. 1-26
|
Subject: | Incentives | Manipulability | Mechanism design | Obvious strategy-proofness | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Manipulation | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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