Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior
I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite populations in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Year of publication: |
2001-08
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Authors: | Possajennikov, Alex |
Institutions: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Dortmund |
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