Executive compemsation : a model of disclosure choice
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Frantz, Pascal ; Instefjord, Norvald ; Walker, Martin J. |
Published in: |
Journal of business finance & accounting : JBFA. - Hudson, NY : John Wiley & Sons Ltd, ISSN 0306-686X, ZDB-ID 192962-8. - Vol. 40.2013, 9/10, p. 1184-1220
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Subject: | executive compensation | corporate governance | coluntary disclosure | strategic opponent | agency setting | economic welfare | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Theorie | Theory |
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