Executive compensation as an agency problem
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian A. ; Fried, Jesse M. |
Published in: |
The economic nature of the firm : a reader. - Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN 978-0-521-19394-8. - 2009, p. 327-345
|
Subject: | Lucian A. Bebchuk | Jesse M. Fried | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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