Executive pay in Japan : the role of bank-appointed monitors and the main bank relationship
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Abe, Naohito ; Gaston, Noel G. ; Kubo, Katsuyuki |
Published in: |
Japan and the world economy : international journal of theory and policy. - Amsterdam : Elsevier Science Publ., ISSN 0922-1425, ZDB-ID 649581-3. - Vol. 17.2005, 3, p. 371-394
|
Subject: | Tournament | Führungskräfte | Managers | Lohn | Wages | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Elektronikindustrie | Electronics industry | Japan |
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