Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information –i.e., pure moral hazard –as well as those in which the agent’s only action is a participation decision – i.e., pure adverse selection. We allow multi-dimensional actions and signals, as well as both …nancial and non-…nancial rewards. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. Consequently, our optimal mechanisms are optimal among all measurable mechanisms. A key to obtaining our result is to permit randomized mechanisms. We also provide conditions under which randomization is unnecessary.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Reny, Philip J. ; Swinkels, Jeroen ; Kadan, Ohad |
Institutions: | Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, University of Chicago |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
Kadan, Ohad, (2017)
-
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization
Reny, Philip J., (2011)
-
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
Reny, Philip J., (2013)
- More ...