Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents
This paper investigates the ability of ambient pollution instruments to induce a group of heterogeneous agents to choose a target outcome. Six controlled laboratory sessions were conducted with heterogeneous agents facing ambient pollution instruments with lump sum or proportional fines and bonuses. Sessions are compared with a study of these exogenous targeting instruments and homogenous agents using complete information and certainty [25]. The data show that contracts can indeed be developed that induce heterogeneous groups to choose the target outcome; however, substantial inefficiency and inequality were observed.
Year of publication: |
2003-02
|
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Authors: | Spraggon, John |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, McMaster University |
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