Experience rating versus employment protection laws in a model where firms monitor workers
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fath, Julia ; Fuest, Clemens |
Published in: |
The Scandinavian journal of economics. - Oxford : Wiley, ISSN 0347-0520, ZDB-ID 8170-X. - Vol. 107.2005, 2, p. 299-313
|
Subject: | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Kündigungsschutz | Dismissal protection | Kündigung | Dismissal | Kosten | Costs | Effizienzlohn | Efficiency wages | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | Westeuropa | Western Europe |
-
Experience Rating Versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model Where Firms Monitor Workers
Fath, Julia, (2005)
-
Optimale Arbeitslosenversicherung und Experience Rating
Fath, Julia, (2008)
-
Unemployment insurance and experience rating in a simple model of involuntary unemployment
Alvi, Eskander, (1998)
- More ...
-
Experience Rating of Unemployment Insurance in the US: A Model for Europe?
Fath, Julia, (2005)
-
Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?
Fath, Julia, (2002)
-
Temporary layoffs and unemployment insurance : is experience rating desirable?
Fath, Julia, (2002)
- More ...