Experience Rating Versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model Where Firms Monitor Workers
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fath, Julia ; Fuest, Clemens |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Kündigungsschutz | Dismissal protection | Theorie | Theory | Kündigung | Dismissal | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Effizienzlohn | Efficiency wages | Kosten | Costs | Westeuropa | Western Europe |
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