Financial reporting comparability and accounting-based relative performance evaluation in the design of CEO cash compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Nam, Jonathan |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 95.2020, 3, p. 343-370
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Subject: | financial reporting comparability | relative performance evaluation | CEO compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Rechnungswesen | Accounting | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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