The role of common risk in the effectiveness of explicit relative performance evaluation
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Tice, Frances M. |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 70.2024, 3, p. 1635-1655
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Subject: | agency costs | executive compensation | peer groups | relative performance evaluation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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