Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Chakrabarti, Subir K. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 32.1999, 2, p. 243-266
|
Subject: | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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