Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizon and imperfect public monitoring
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Guéron, Yves |
Published in: |
The Korean economic review. - Seoul : KEA, ISSN 0254-3737, ZDB-ID 1385036-2. - Vol. 35.2019, 1, p. 109-123
|
Subject: | Dynamic Games | Asymptotically Finite Horizon | Folk-theorem | Imperfect Monitoring | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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