Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring.

This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

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Year of publication:	2010-09
Authors:	Contou-Carrère, Pauline ; Tomala, Tristan
Institutions:	Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Subject:	Finitely repeated games \| semi-standard monitoring \| folk theorem

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. - ISSN 1955-611X.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679896