Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Abstract This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Contou-Carrère, Pauline ; Tomala, Tristan
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 47.2011, 1, p. 14-21
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Finitely repeated games Semi-standard monitoring Folk Theorem

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870847