Firm performance implications of using qualitative criteria in CEO bonus contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Kurt, Ahmet C. ; Feng, Nancy Chun |
Published in: |
Advances in management accounting : a research annual. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 1474-7871, ZDB-ID 1161550-3. - Vol. 31.2019, p. 55-89
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Subject: | Bonus contracts | Chief executive officers | Earnings management | Executive compensation | Firm performance | Performance criteria | Führungskräfte | Managers | Unternehmenserfolg | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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