Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword : optimal incentives under misreporting
Gino Loyola, Yolanda Portilla
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Loyola, Gino ; Portilla, Yolanda |
| Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 69.2020, p. 994-1017
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| Subject: | Bonus cap | Corporate governance | Earning management | Executive compensation | Monotone likelihood ratio property | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.iref.2020.04.007 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012487465