Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases Effort
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Brooks, Richard R. W. ; Stremitzer, Alexander ; Tontrup, Stephan |
Published in: |
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 168.2012, 1, p. 62-82
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Extent: | text/html |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | K12 - Contract Law ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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