Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mathis, Jérôme |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 4105394. - Vol. 143.2008, 1, p. 571-585
|
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
Mathis, Jérôme, (2008)
-
Rating the raters : are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?
Mathis, Jérôme, (2009)
-
Jaffee, Dwight M., (2009)
- More ...