Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Gayle, George-Levi ; Miller, Robert A. |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 99.2009, 5, p. 1740-69
|
Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Extent: | application/pdf application/zip |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Notes: | DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1740 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L25 - Firm Size and Performance ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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