Home alone : the effects of lone‐insider boards on ceo pay, financial misconduct, and firm performance
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
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Authors: | Zorn, Michelle L. ; Shropshire, Christine ; Martin, John A. ; Combs, James G. ; Ketchen, David J. <Jr.> |
Published in: |
Strategic management journal. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 0143-2095, ZDB-ID 164405-1. - Vol. 38.2017, 13, p. 2623-2646
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Subject: | corporate governance | boards of directors | CEOs | agency theory | board independence | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Vorstand | Executive board | Board of Directors | Board of directors |
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