Lone-insider boards: Improved monitoring or a recipe for disaster?
Alternative title: | Improved monitoring or a recipe for disaster? |
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Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Zorn, Michelle L. ; Martin, John A. ; Combs, James G. |
Published in: |
Journal of managerial issues : JMI. - Pittsburg, Kan. : PSU, ISSN 1045-3695, ZDB-ID 1131458-8. - Vol. 24.2012, 3, p. 345-362
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Subject: | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie der Unternehmung | Theory of the firm |
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