How many winners are good to have? On tournaments with sabotage
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Harbring, Christine ; Irlenbusch, Bernd |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | relative performance evaluation | personnel economics | sabotage | experiments |
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 1777 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 506046613 [GVK] hdl:10419/33307 [Handle] |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L23 - Organization of Production ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
-
Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine, (2004)
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How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage
Harbring, Christine, (2005)
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine, (2004)
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Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives
Danilov, Anastasia, (2019)
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine, (2004)
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Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis
Kräkel, Matthias, (2004)
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