How much common belief is necessary for a convention?
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Shin, Hyun Song |
Other Persons: | Williamson, Timothy (contributor) |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 13.1996, 2, p. 252-268
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Soziologie | Sociology | Theorie | Theory |
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