How reliable should auditors be? : Optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dittmann, Ingolf |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 15.1999, 3, p. 523-546
|
Subject: | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Korruption | Corruption | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
-
How reliable should auditors be? : Optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships
Dittmann, Ingolf, (1997)
-
The environment and corruption : monetary vs. non-monetary incentives and the first best
Pal, Rupayan, (2022)
-
The effects of imperfect auditing on managerial compensation
Baglioni, Angelo, (2011)
- More ...
-
Block Trading, Ownership Structure, and the Value of Corporate Votes
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2004)
-
How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2009)
-
The corporate calendar and the timing of share repurchases and equity compensation
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2022)
- More ...