Identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs are not in equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Aguirregabiria, Victor ; Magesan, Arvind |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies : RES. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Pr., ISSN 1467-937X, ZDB-ID 2009656-2. - Vol. 87.2020, 2, p. 582-625
|
Subject: | Dynamic games | Rational behaviour | Biased beliefs | Rationalizability | Identification | Estimation | Market entry-exit | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Rationalität | Rationality | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Markteintritt | Market entry |
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