Identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs are not in equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aguirregabiria, Victor ; Magesan, Arvind |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies : RES. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Pr., ISSN 1467-937X, ZDB-ID 2009656-2. - Vol. 87.2020, 2, p. 582-625
|
Subject: | Dynamic games | Rational behaviour | Biased beliefs | Rationalizability | Identification | Estimation | Market entry-exit | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Theorie | Theory | Rationalität | Rationality | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Schätzung | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Markteintritt | Market entry | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game |
-
Identification andn estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs are not in equilibrium
Aguirregabiria, Victor, (2015)
-
Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players' Beliefs are Not in Equilibrium
Aguirregabiria, Victor, (2016)
-
Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
Perea, Andrés, (2017)
- More ...
-
Essays on Empirical Dynamic Games and Imperfect Information
Magesan, Arvind, (2011)
-
Euler Equations for the Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models
Aguirregabiria, Victor, (2013)
-
Identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs are not in equilibrium
Aguirregabiria, Victor, (2012)
- More ...