Impact of an equal pay norm on the optimal design of incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
April 2016
|
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Authors: | Krapp, Michael ; Sandner, Kai |
Published in: |
Journal of business economics : JBE. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0044-2372, ZDB-ID 201074-4. - Vol. 86.2016, 3, p. 301-338
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Subject: | Equal pay norm | Wage compression | Relative performance evaluation | Team-based compensation | Cooperation | Theorie | Theory | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Soziale Norm | Social norm | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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